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ABSTRACT 
Funds from banks play an important role in the growth and maintenance of a firm. Hence, it 
is important that a firm creates and maintains a good relationship with its bank in order to 
secure the funds. Establishing a good bank-firm relationship can also help to reduce conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors since close bank relationship helps the firm to get funding 
from other financial institutions. Relationships between a bank and a firm consist of two 
types: bank-borrower relationship and consumer-supplier relationship. The bank-borrower 
relationship involves primarily a loan agreement between two interested parties. Cooperation 
between a bank and a firm is more durable than customer-supplier relationships in terms of 
provision of financing. This thesis investigates the effect of banking relationships on firm 
performance on companies in Malaysian capital market. Seventy eight firms from the Top 
100 public-listed companies in Bursa Malaysia are examined. Investigation is performed to 
show the effects of number of banking relationships, short-term financing, long-term 
financing, firm size, and foreign ownership on the firms’ performance as measured by return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q. Findings show a significant and 
negative relationships on the number of bank relationships for all of firm performance 
measures, consistent with previous studies. For ROA measurement, result shows a significant 
positive relationship with short-term financing, a finding also consistent with past studies. 
Short-term loan and long-term loan impact ROA and ROE positively, while affecting 
negatively firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. ROA and ROE have a positive 
correlation with foreign ownership, while Tobin’s Q is negatively correlated with foreign 
ownership. In general, the study contributes to banking literature by investigating and 
evaluating the relationship of firm performance and lending banks in shareholders’ 
perspectives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to Study 
 
As the business world today becomes more competitive and challenging, firms must have 
good management in order to improve their performance and sustain it. The management 
includes the board of directors as a resource provider because they provide social and 
business contacts, and influence the environment in favors of the firms (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). It is also believed that managers have the capability as a resource to provide 
connections to other business sectors and also to the external environment (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). However, there is a separation between management and owners, where the managers 
tend to act with self-interest that are not always in the best interest of the owners (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).    
 
In order to avoid any irresponsible and unethical acts, the regulatory bodies and shareholders 
are required to impose a monitoring and control process via corporate governance code to 
control risks. Corporate governance generally refers to the mechanisms, processes and 
relations by which firms are controlled and directed. It identifies the rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation (such as the board of directors, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders) and includes 
the rules and procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs. Corporate governance 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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